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OPEN ACCESS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A Critique of Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v. Broward County

4 Yale Symp. L. & Tech. 6 (2001)
David Wolitz∗
Abstract:
To what extent does the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment bar the adoption of
“open access” regulations? Open access (or “net neutrality”) refers to a policy that would
require broadband Internet providers, such as cable and phone companies, to allow
competitive Internet Service Providers (ISPs) onto their broadband lines at
nondiscriminatory rates. A federal district court in Florida recently held Broward
County’s open access ordinance unconstitutional on the grounds that it would force
speech – in the form of Internet content – on to the local cable company. If the district
court’s analysis is correct, then open access regulations are foreclosed by the Free Speech
Clause. This article argues that open access regulations are, in fact, thoroughly consistent
with the First Amendment. Broadband providers maintain the kind of “bottleneck”
control over Internet content that justifies regulations aimed at facilitating the free flow of
information. Broadband providers are already using their strategic position to interfere in
the e-commerce and video-downloading markets, and they have the power to speed up or
slow down the delivery of Web-pages and other Internet applications. By breaking the
broadband provider’s bottleneck control over Internet content and applications, open
access regulations serve the important government objectives of facilitating robust public
discourse and free markets. The First Amendment does not stand in the way of this
important policy proposal.
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OPEN ACCESS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A Critique of Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v. Broward County

I. INTRODUCTION
By striking down major portions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996,1 the
Supreme Court put policymakers on notice that free speech must be respected in the new
domain of regulations concerning the Internet. Consequently, one of the most important
questions facing legislative and regulatory bodies across the country is the extent to
which the First Amendment confines the government’s ability to shape the media and
communications infrastructure of cyberspace. On November 8, 2000, Judge Donald M.
Middlebrooks of the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Florida entered
this discussion in dramatic fashion. Invoking the First Amendment and a free speech
tradition dating back to John Milton, Judge Middlebrooks voided a Broward County
ordinance mandating “open access” on Internet-capable cable lines.2
In Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v. Broward County,3 Judge
Middlebrooks presents an expansive view of the First Amendment and defends its
salience in the Internet age. The judge correctly subjected the county ordinance to First
Amendment review. However, I believe that current First Amendment doctrine permits
the government a wider purview within which to pursue communications regulation than
Judge Middlebrooks’ opinion allows. Specifically, I aim to show that the First
Amendment presents no bar to open access regulations of the kind promulgated by
Broward County.
My argument does not depend on a belief in the wisdom of open access as public policy.
Rather, I endeavor to demonstrate that the debate over open access should go forward on
the merits, without a First Amendment bar. In order to make my case that open access
regulations are consistent with the Free Speech Clause, I will provide a short introduction
to the open access policy debate before turning a critical eye to the Broward County case.

II. THE OPEN ACCESS DEBATE
“Open access” refers to a policy that requires cable operators to allow all Internet Service
Providers (ISPs), regardless of corporate affiliation, to lease bandwidth on the cable lines
at nondiscriminatory rates.4 Currently, almost all of the major cable companies are locked
1

Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685 (S.D. Fla. 2000)
[hereinafter Broward County].
3
Id.
4
The Broward County open access ordinance reads, in pertinent part, “‘Subject to technical feasibility,
[cable] Franchisee shall provide any requesting Internet Service Provider access to its Broadband Internet
2
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into exclusive deals with one of two cable-modem ISPs (Excite@Home or
RoadRunner),5 excluding the nation’s 6,000 dial-up ISPs from the most popular
residential broadband platform.6 Broadband connections provide consumers with a
substantially faster, richer, and more convenient Internet experience than traditional dialup “narrowband” service.7 Broadband vastly speeds up all conventional data flows and
makes possible high-quality video and audio transmissions over the Internet. Moreover,
since broadband Internet connections are “always-on” and do not interfere with standard
telephone service, they are significantly more convenient than today’s standard dial-up
service.
Predictably, dial-up ISPs that lack access to the cable platform are concerned that they
will be unable to compete as consumers switch to superior broadband service. Local
telephone companies, now promoting their own broadband Internet service (DSL), also
feel that they are unfairly disadvantaged because their common-carrier status prevents
them from entering into similar exclusive agreements with preferred ISPs. Therefore,
these competitors to cable Internet service have pushed for legislation mandating cable
unbundling. Cable unbundling (otherwise known as “open access”) entails separating, as
a matter of policy, the cable lines from the Internet service provided over these lines. The
result is a competitive ISP market on the cable platform.
Proponents of cable unbundling-including, at times, such corporate heavyweights as
America Online8 and Bell Atlantic-GTE (now Verizon),9 as well as public interest groups
Access Transport Services (unbundled from the provision of content) on rates, terms, and conditions that
are at least as favorable as those on which it provides such access to itself, to its affiliate, or to any other
person. Such access shall be provided at any technically feasible point selected by the requesting Internet
Service Provider.”‘ Id. at 686-87 (citation omitted).
5
See Steven van Yoder, Open Access and AT&T, BOARDWATCH, Sept. 2000, available at
http://www.ispworld.com/bw/sep/Open_Access.htm (“[O]f the estimated 2 million consumers who
subscribe to high-speed Internet access over cable lines, 97 percent get the service from Excite@Home or
Road Runner, heavily owned by AT&T and Time Warner Inc. respectively.”).
6
I derive the figure of 6,000 ISPs from Tom Spring. Tom Spring, ISPs Share Urge to Merge, PC World,
Feb. 1999, available at http:// www.pcworld.com/news/article.asp?aid=9924.
7
The FCC defines broadband as the provision of Internet service at speeds exceeding 200 kilobits per
second (kbps) in the last mile in both provider-to-consumer (downstream) and consumer-to-provider
(upstream) directions. See In the Matter of Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced
Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps
to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC
Docket No. 98-146, 14 F.C.C.R. 2398, ¶ 20 (1999) [hereinafter 706 Report].
8
AOL was the driving force behind the “open access” (i.e., unbundling) lobbying effort until it announced
its intention to acquire Time-Warner, Inc. Among other concerns, Time-Warner operates about 20% of the
country’s cable systems. See Tony Perkins, Readers Talk Back on AOL/Time Warner, REDHERRING.com,
Jan. 20, 2000, available at http:// www.redherring.com/insider/2000/0120/news-redeye012000.html.
Consequently, AOL lost much of its incentive to fight for unbundling. AOL has essentially bought its way
on to at least 20% of the cable infrastructure and now has a strong bargaining position from which to gain
access to the rest of the country’s cable systems. AOL’s current public position appears to be that cable
operators ought to open their lines to unaffiliated ISPs. See Jerry Berman & John Morris, Testimony of the
Center for Democracy & Technology before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
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like the American Civil Liberties Union10 - have taken their case to Congress, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), and local cable franchising authorities across the
country.11 They argue that a closed cable platform will negatively impact the growth of
the Internet not only by decreasing competition and diversity in Internet service and
Internet content, but also by warping the online applications market. On the other side,
AT&T, Time-Warner, and other major cable service operators defend the status quo and
contend that regulation of the cable Internet service market will slow down investment in
this important new communications technology.12
So far, AT&T and its cable allies have managed to avoid federal action on cable
unbundling.13 Legislation has been introduced in both the House and Senate that would
require open access, and various congressional committees have held extensive hearings
on broadband Internet development.14 Moreover, both the Fair Trade Commission and
the FCC have focused on the open access issue in scrutinizing AT&T’s proposed
acquisition of cable giant MediaOne and the mammoth AOL-Time-Warner merger. No
unbundling proposal has made it out of committee, however, and no decisive action is
expected soon.15 The FCC has argued that no action is required at the present time
because, in its view, sufficient competition already exists in the nascent broadband
Internet access market, and new regulatory action would serve only to increase investor
uncertainty.16 At the same time, the Commission claims that it possesses the authority to
enact regulations should it find it appropriate to do so in the future.17
At the local level, the pro-unbundling forces have had more success. They achieved their
first significant victory in November 1998 when Portland, Oregon became the first
jurisdiction in the country to formally impose unbundling requirements on its local cable

Transportation Subcommittee on Communications, Mar. 2, 2000, available at
http://www.cdt.org/testimony/000302berman.shtml. This position suggests that AOL believes that there is
no need for government legislation or regulation to mandate access.
9
See Verizon, Open Access (visited Mar. 4, 2001), at http://
www.gte.com/AboutGTE/publicpolicy/openaccess/index.html.
10
See Press Release, Barry Steinhardt, ACLU, Internet Must Not Become “Walled Garden”, Dec. 13, 2000,
available at http:// www.aclu.org/news/2000/n121300a.html.
11
See Stephen Labaton, Fight for Internet Access Creates Unusual Alliances, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1999,
at A1.
12
See Brief of Amicus Curiae Hands Off the Internet, AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th
Cir. 2000) (No. 99-35609), available at http:// techlawjournal.com/courts/portland/19990811.htm.
13
See Labaton, supra note 11.
14
For a summary of all relevant bills now being considered in Congress, see Summary of Bills Affecting
Broadband Internet Access in the 106th Congress (last updated May 28, 2000), available at http://
www.techlawjournal.com/cong106/broadband/Default.htm.
15
See Labaton, supra note 11.
16
See 706 Report, supra note 7, ¶ 91; John Borland, FCC Gives Cautious Thumbs-Up to Broadband
Market, CNETNEWS.COM, Aug. 3, 2000, available at http:// news.cnet.com/news/0-1004-2022428442.html.
17
See 706 Report, supra note 7, ¶ 93.

3

franchise.18 AT&T immediately challenged the regulation, arguing that it violated the
Cable Act19 as well as AT&T’s First Amendment right to transmit speech solely of its
own choosing over the cable lines.20 While the district court dismissed AT&T’s case and
upheld the regulation,21 this outcome was reversed by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals.22 The Ninth Circuit held that broadband Internet service offered over cable lines
does not constitute a “cable service” as that term is defined in the relevant provisions of
the Cable Act.23 As a result, the court argued that local franchising authorities, like
Portland, have no statutory basis pursuant to the Cable Act to exercise regulatory power
over broadband cable Internet service.24 Though the decision was a local victory for
AT&T, the court clearly held that the FCC could enact such mandates at the national
level if it so wished.25
In the meantime, a number of other localities, most notably San Francisco26 and Los
Angeles27, have held high-profile debates over unbundling. However, only a few local
cable franchising authorities- including those in Richmond, Virginia and Broward County,
Florida-have followed Portland’s lead in formally adopting open access provisions. Like
the Ninth Circuit, district courts in both Richmond and Broward County have struck
down open access regulations, though in strikingly different ways. The Richmond Court
took an approach similar to that of the Ninth Circuit and found that the statutory division
of powers in the Cable Act prevents local franchising authorities from imposing open
18

The two cable services operating in Portland and Multnomah County in 1998 were both owned by TeleCommunication, Inc. (TCI). TCI was acquired by AT&T in mid-1998, and pursuant to its franchise
agreements with the City of Portland and Multnomah County, TCI was obliged to request approval from
the City and County to shift control of its “franchisees” to AT&T. After holding multiple hearings on the
issue, the City and County agreed to approve the change of control only on the condition that the new
owner (AT&T) “‘provide, and cause Franchisees to provide, nondiscriminatory access to Franchisees’
cable modem platform for providers of internet and on-line services, whether or nor such providers are
affiliated with Transferee [AT&T] or Franchisees ....”‘ AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 43 F. Supp. 2d
1146, 1150 (D. Or. 1999). In effect, Portland required unbundling as a condition for AT&T’s control over
the local cable companies.
19
The “Cable Act,” 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-573, refers to Title VI of the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
20
See AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (D. Or. 1999).
21
See id.
22
See AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000).
23
See id. at 876 (“[W]e begin with the question of whether the @Home [cable Internet] service truly is a
‘cable service’ as Congress defined it in the Communications Act. We conclude that it is not.”).
24
See id. at 877 (“[B]ecause the Internet services AT&T provides through @Home cable modem access are
not ‘cable services’ under the Communications Act, Portland may not directly regulate them through its
franchising authority.”).
25
See id. at 879-80.
26
The San Francisco Board of Supervisors voted in July 1999 not to require immediate unbundling of the
local cable lines, but to revisit the issue pending the outcome of the legal challenge to Portland’s
regulations. See Labaton, supra note 11.
27
The City of Los Angeles passed a resolution calling on cable operators to respect “open access”
principles, but it has not adopted a binding ordinance requiring unbundling. See Brian Krebs, Los Angeles
Passes Cable Open Access Resolution, NEWSBYTES, Nov. 21, 2000, available at http://
www.newsbytes.com/news/00/158480.html.
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access regulations.28
As statutory interpretations, the Ninth Circuit and Richmond opinions allow for future
federal action on open access initiatives. However, the November 8, 2000 decision of
Judge Middlebrooks struck down Broward County’s open access ordinance on
constitutional grounds.29 In a full-length decision dealing exclusively with the free speech
issue, Judge Middlebrooks agreed with the cable operators that unbundling violates their
First Amendment right to editorial discretion over content transmitted on their lines. If
upheld by the Supreme Court, the Broward County decision would completely bar open
access regulation by all levels of government, including Congress itself.
III. CRITIQUING THE BROWARD COUNTY OPINION
If Judge Middlebrooks’ First Amendment jurisprudence is correct, the debate over open
access should grind to a halt. No matter how worthwhile unbundling may be as public
policy, it would not be worth a fight if it violated the highest law of the land. However,
my analysis will show how the Broward County opinion is flawed and why open access
is constitutional under current First Amendment jurisprudence. As in many controversial
First Amendment cases, the two key issues are (1) what level of judicial scrutiny applies
to the regulation, and (2) how the court ought to conduct the balancing test required at the
applicable level of scrutiny.30 Judge Middlebrooks found that unbundling should be
subject to the usually fatal strict scrutiny or, alternatively, that it would fail the test of
intermediate scrutiny. My contention is that open access triggers intermediate, rather than
strict scrutiny, and that a proper weighing of evidence illustrates that the government
interest in open access regulation justifies a small diminution in the editorial discretion of
cable operators.

A. The Road to Intermediate Scrutiny
1. Is Speech At Issue?
A judge’s first burden in striking down an ordinance as inconsistent with the Free Speech
Clause is to show that speech is implicated by the regulation.31 The district court judge in
AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland argued that speech was simply not at issue in the open
access debate: “There is no free speech violation ... because AT&T volunteered to give
cable subscribers access to competing ISPs ... It [the open access ordinance] does not
28

See MediaOne Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 97 F. Supp. 2d 712, 717 (E.D. Va. 2000).
See Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685, 698 (S.D.
Fla. 2000) (“[T]he ordinance violates the First Amendment.”).
30
Id. at 697 (“I believe ... strict scrutiny is required. However, if I am mistaken, the ordinance fails contentneutral scrutiny as well.”).
31
See Kathleen M. Sullivan & Gerald Gunther, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 369 (1999) (“If a law does
not compel speech, ... then no First Amendment scrutiny is required.”).
29
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force plaintiffs to carry any particular speech.”32 This argument had some resonance in
the Portland case because AT&T’s own rhetoric at the time touted the openness of its
system. AT&T claimed that its cable modem subscribers could access all Internet content,
including the proprietary content and services of other ISPs, provided that they first
purchased @Home’s Internet service.33 AT&T even noted that @Home customers could
make a competing ISP’s homepage their own default first page.34 This stance was
somewhat deceptive as customers were unlikely to purchase any Internet service on top
of the @Home service they were already paying for. But it did mean that a provision
allowing competing ISPs to connect directly to customers over the cable platform, i.e.
open access, had no particular speech implications. It merely changed the economic
regulations under which unaffiliated ISPs could reach cable-modem customers. In other
words, open access forced no identifiable speech on AT&T that AT&T had not already
agreed to carry. Hence, the Portland judge reasoned, AT&T could make no claim that its
speech rights were implicated by the regulation.
The weakness of this argument came to light in the Broward County case when the cable
operators changed their rhetorical stance. Instead of touting the ostensibly open nature of
the cable-modem network, the cable operators in Broward County baldly asserted that
they did not want to carry certain speech because they objected to its content. According
to Judge Middlebrooks, “They [the cable operators] consider some Internet providers
unacceptable because of offensive or hateful programming.”35 Thus, the cable operators
in Broward County were able to point to a hypothetical domain of speech which, absent
open access, they would choose not to carry-namely certain types of offensive or hateful
32

AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1154 (D. Or. 1999) (citations omitted).
During the regulatory review of AT&T’s proposed merger with cable operator Tele-Communications,
Inc. (TCI), AT&T assured the FCC that “subscribers [to @Home Internet service] are provided with
browsing and e-mail functionalities similar in nature to those offered by other ISPs, [and it] permit[s} those
subscribers to send and receive e-mail and reach any available content on the World Wide Web, including
proprietary content and services offered by AOL, Yahoo!, and others.” In the Matter of Applications for
Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations from Tele-Communications,
Inc. Transferor, to AT&T Corp., Transferee, CS Docket No. 98-178, 14 F.C.C.R. 3160, ¶ 72 (1999),
available at http:// www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/Orders/1999/fcc99024.txt [hereinafter Consent to
Transfer].
As the City of Portland put it in one of its trial briefs, “TCI and AT&T have told the FCC that even in
the absence of open access conditions, @Home users can obtain any content. In fact, TCI and AT&T have
asserted that users will be able to obtain service from the very companies that would take advantage of
open modem platform conditions-albeit under economically disadvantageous conditions. Thus, the
companies have conceded that the same information could flow over the cable system with or without the
open access condition, and the same entities could use the platform.” Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Cross
Mot. in Supp. of Summ. J., AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (D. Or. 1999) (No. CV9965 PA), available at http:// www.techlawjournal.com/courts/portland/19990326.htm.
34
AT&T and TCI assured the FCC that “TCI customers subscribing to AOL ... can connect directly to
AOL by ‘double clicking’ on the AOL icon on their computer desktop. They do not have to ‘go through’
@Home or view any @Home-provided content or screens. In fact, if they so desire, customers will be able
to remove the @Home icon from their desktop completely.” Consent to Transfer, supra note 33, 14
F.C.C.R. at ¶ 95.
35
Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 691.
33

6

programming. Whether this represents a genuine, principled opposition to “offensive and
hateful programming” is subject to doubt. But it illustrates the fact that ISPs may filter
out Internet content and applications that they find objectionable if they so choose. Thus
different ISPs may offer significantly different “cuts” of the Internet to their customers.
By requiring cable operators to lease their lines indiscriminately to all ISPs, open access
prevents the cable operator from choosing ISPs on the basis of their content (i.e.,
filtering) policies. Thus, open access may force unwanted speech on cable operators and
diminish their editorial discretion over content transmitted on their lines.
2. Is Open Access a Content-Based Regulation?
Because open access regulations impose “special obligations upon cable operators ...,
some measure of heightened First Amendment scrutiny is demanded.”36 Whether it is
subject to intermediate or strict scrutiny depends on whether the effect of open access on
speech is content-neutral or content-based. As the Court explained in Turner
Broadcasting System v. FCC [hereinafter Turner I],
Our precedents ... apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress,
disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content.
Laws that compel speakers to utter or distribute speech bearing a particular message
are subject to the same rigorous scrutiny. In contrast, regulations that are unrelated
to the content of speech are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny because in
most cases they pose a less substantial risk of excising certain ideas or viewpoints
from the public dialogue.37
In Turner I, the Supreme Court confronted cable “must carry” regulations, which
required cable operators to carry local broadcasting television channels on their cable
systems. In a five-to-four decision, the Court held that must carry did not constitute a
content-based provision because Congress’ aim in passing the legislation was not to
suppress or prefer any particular speech.38 The regulation, according to the Court, was
meant to “serve three interrelated interests: (1) preserving the benefits of free, over-theair local broadcast television, (2) promoting the widespread dissemination of information
from a multiplicity of sources, and (3) promoting fair competition in the market for
television programming.”39 While the minority felt that the must carry provisions
constituted a preference for the content of broadcast programming over cable
programming,40 the majority argued that “[n]one of these interests is related to the
‘suppression of free expression,’ or to the content of any speakers’ messages.”41
Consequently, the Court applied only intermediate scrutiny to the must carry provisions.
36

Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) [hereinafter Turner I].
See id. at 642 (citations omitted).
38
Id. at 661-62.
39
Id. at 662.
40
See id. at 679 (O’Connor, J., dissenting in part).
41
Id. at 662 (citations omitted).
37
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Turner I is the Supreme Court case most relevant to cable unbundling. Like must carry,
open access aims to promote competition in an important information medium and seeks
to foster “widespread dissemination of information from a multiplicity of sources.” Of
course, there are a variety of reasons for promoting open access regulations, and the
competing ISPs and local telephone companies are clearly motivated primarily by
commercial self-interest. However, the public policy rationale for open access is quite
strong. Simply put, open access is intended to mitigate the danger of local-monopoly
cable operators coming to dominate the Internet access market. While there are
competitors to cable in the residential broadband Internet market (most notably, DSL
service), cable operators appear to be staking out a dominant position from which they
will wield enormous power over the content and future development of the Internet.42
Cable operators with exclusive ISPs can pick and choose which content and which
applications to allow their customers to access; consequently, they serve as gatekeepers
determining what content and which new innovations succeed.43 In addition, compelling
economic arguments can be made that a competitive ISP market is worth maintaining for
the standard reasons that competitive markets tend to deliver better service at lower
prices to consumers than monopolistic or oligopolistic markets.44
There is no plausible argument to be made-and none has been offered- that the County
open access ordinances adopted in Portland or Broward are actually motivated by those
governments’ distaste for the content or message of local cable operators, or by a County
government preference for the viewpoints expounded by unaffiliated ISPs. Those local
governments that have adopted unbundling measures, and those now considering them,
are motivated by a legitimate belief that ISP competition on the cable lines would be
better for the development of the Internet than cable bundling. If, as the Turner I Court
wrote, the “principal inquiry in determining content neutrality ... is whether the
government has adopted a regulation of speech because of [agreement or] disagreement

42

The FCC estimates that cable operators hold 84% of the residential broadband market. See Federal
Communications Commission, Graphic, Shares of Residential Advanced Services by Technology, available
at http:// www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/News_Releases/2000/ncc0040b.doc.
43
According to Professors Mark Lemley and Lawrence Lessig, the current Internet architecture operates on
an End-to-End principle such that no central power exists to thwart or disrupt innovation. See Mark A.
Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, In the Matter of Application for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses
MediaOne Group, Inc., to AT&T Corp., CS Docket No. 99-251, available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/works/lessig/MB.html. This End-to-End principle relies in large measure on
the common carrier telephone system over which most people access the Internet today. Local phone
companies cannot choose an exclusive ISP or discriminate among Internet content and applications running
over their lines. Allowing cable operators to attain a dominant market position in broadband Internet access,
without accompanying open access regulation, would effectively grant them a privileged central perch from
which they could warp this evolving medium. See id.
44
Gene Kimmelman, Co-Director of Consumers Union’s Washington Office, has said explicitly on the
topic that “[w]ithout competition, Internet users will face higher prices and fewer service options.”
Bloomberg News, Advocates Demand Cable Open Access, CNET.COM Apr. 9, 1999, available at http://
www.canada.cnet.com/news/0-1004-200-340996.html.
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with the message it conveys,”45 then unbundling regulations are clearly content-neutral.
3. Distinguishing Turner: Strike One
Judge Middlebrooks acknowledged that Turner I set the framework for the First
Amendment debate over open access, but he argued that “the reasons given by the Court
for applying intermediate rather than strict scrutiny do not apply in this case.”46 While the
judge offered three reasons for diverging from Turner I, none of them is very convincing.
“First,” argued the court, “unlike the must carry rules which applied to virtually all cable
operators in the country, the Broward County ordinance applies only to the select few
that seek to operate broadband Internet.”47 Judge Middlebrooks argues here that the
ordinance makes an invidious distinction between cable operators because it “applies”
only to those who make an editorial decision to offer Internet service in the first place.
However, for the three reasons I lay out below, his observation fails to show either a
distinction between must carry and open access or that the ordinance is content-based.
First, the must carry regulations made different demands on different cable systems. For
instance, those with twelve channels or less were required to carry only three local
broadcast stations, while those with more than twelve channels had to reserve up to onethird of their channel capacity for local broadcast stations.48 Furthermore, cable systems
with less than 300 subscribers, no matter how large their channel capacity, had no must
carry obligations at all.49 According to Judge Middlebrooks’ reasoning, then, must carry
also “applied” only to those cable operators successful enough to sign up 300 customers
or more, and discriminated even more insidiously against those that offered more than
twelve channels of video programming. This is no basis on which to rest a distinction
between Turner and the case at issue.
Second, the idea that must carry “applies” only to those cable operators that provide
broadband Internet service is true only if one deliberately misunderstands the normal use
of the term “apply.” The ordinance at issue clearly applies to all County cable operators,
but naturally, the unbundling provisions are triggered only when a cable operator begins
to offer Internet access over its lines. After all, it would be nonsense to speak of an
unbundling provision that affected a cable operator that had no broadband Internet
facility to unbundle.

45

See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 642 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685, 696 (S.D. Fla.
2000).
47
Id. This is a surprising assertion because in his description of the ordinance at issue, the judge wrote
earlier in the same opinion that the “ordinance ... is applicable to all County granted cable franchisees.” Id.
at 686.
48
47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(1) (2000).
49
Id.
46
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Lastly, the distinction between cable operators that offer Internet service and those that
do not is not a distinction based on “‘[agreement or] disagreement with the message it
conveys.”‘50 It is a distinction based on the different transmission capacities of the cable
operators, not on the County’s view of the merits of the cable ISP’s content. A distinction
between cable operators that do and do not offer Internet service is simply not a contentbased distinction; it is certainly no more than a distinction between cable operators that
carry more or less than twelve channels.
4. Distinguishing Turner: Strike Two
Judge Middlebrooks’ second and third arguments distinguishing must carry from open
access touch on the controversial area of medium-specific First Amendment standards. In
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, which justified government regulation of broadcast
television, the Supreme Court wrote, “differences in the characteristics of new media
justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them.”51 Ever since, the
Court has been decidedly more sympathetic to government regulation of broadcast
television than to government regulation of the print media.52 How cable television fits
into this bifurcated First Amendment jurisprudence has been a controversial question
since the advent of cable television and has not been definitively answered.53
On the one hand, the majority in Turner I clearly wrote, “the rationale for applying a less
rigorous standard of First Amendment scrutiny to broadcast regulation, whatever its
validity in the cases elaborating it, does not apply in the context of cable regulation.”54 In
other words, the Court held that cable regulations are not eligible for the more deferential
review granted to broadcast regulations. Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion also cautioned, “[t]his is not to say that the unique physical characteristics of
cable transmission should be ignored when determining the constitutionality of
regulations affecting cable speech.”55 Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy went on to
elaborate what has come to be known as the “bottleneck” theory of cable regulation:
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When an individual subscribes to cable, the physical connection between the
television set and the cable network gives the cable operator bottleneck, or
gatekeeper, control over most (if not all) of the television programming that is
channeled to a subscriber’s home. Hence, simply by virtue of its ownership of the
essential pathway for cable speech, a cable operator can prevent its subscribers from
obtaining access to programming it chooses to exclude .... The potential for abuse of
this private power over a central avenue of communication cannot be overlooked.
The First Amendment’s command that government not impede the freedom of
speech does not disable the government from taking steps to ensure that private
interests not restrict, through physical control of a critical pathway of
communication, the free flow of information and ideas.56
In Turner I, the bottleneck theory served as one means of distinguishing must carry from
seemingly similar print regulations that had been struck down in Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo (Tornillo)57 and Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. PUC of
California (PG&E).58
Judge Middlebrooks’ assertion in Broward County is simply that “[c]able operators
control no bottleneck monopoly over access to the Internet.”59 Thus, the bottleneck
theory employed in Turner I has no bearing on the case, and the strict scrutiny test
employed in Tornillo and PG&E applies instead. Again, Judge Middlebrooks’ argument
does not hold up under careful analysis. First, even if he were correct that the bottleneck
theory does not apply to cable Internet access, that assertion alone would not be a
sufficient reason to conclude that Tornillo and PG&E control. Tornillo and PG&E were
both cases in which the regulation at issue was deemed content-based by the Court,
regardless of medium.60 Judge Middlebrooks bears the burden not just of showing that
Turner I does not control the open access case, but also of showing independently that
open access is a content-based regulation.
More importantly, Judge Middlebrooks misunderstands the bottleneck theory. In support
of his contention that cable Internet access does not pose the same bottleneck concerns as
cable television, the judge noted, “[l]ocal telephone companies provide dial up Internet
access to over 46.5 million customers, whereas all cable companies combined currently
56
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provide Internet services to only about two million customers.”61 He went on to cite an
FCC report on broadband access, concluding, “it does not foresee monopoly, or even
duopoly in broadband Internet services.”62 For the judge, these facts demonstrate that
cable does not impose a bottleneck problem on Internet access. This reasoning is flawed
for two reasons.
First, the “bottleneck” that the Turner Court found is a bottleneck that occurs in a cable
subscriber’s home once he or she chooses to subscribe to cable television. It is not, as
Judge Middlebrooks appears to believe, a theory that cable television constitutes a
monopoly in the provision of all video programming.63 The Turner Court found correctly
that, once a home subscribes to cable and attaches the cable wire to the television set, it
becomes immensely difficult-if not practically impossible-to receive both cable channels
and over-the-air broadcast channels. This difficulty arises from the way in which
televisions connect to the cable line.64 Through the physical connection between the cable
line and the television, the cable operator maintains an effective “gatekeeping” position
in the provision of video services to a cable-subscribing household.
Likewise, once a household makes a decision to use a cable modem to connect to the
Internet, it becomes immensely difficult-though not practically impossible-to receive
Internet access via a telephone line. Again, this difficulty arises from the way computers
connect to cable Internet modems. Theoretically, one could go through the laborious
process of unhooking the cable modem, changing various software settings, setting up a
telephone modem, and then connecting to the Internet in this way. However, for all
practical purposes once a household sets up cable-modem Internet service, the cable line
becomes the bottleneck for all Internet content coming into or going out of the home.
This is the same bottleneck of which Turner speaks.65 The relative popularity or market
share of cable simply has no bearing on whether it creates a “bottleneck” in the way that
term is used in Turner. The bottleneck problem of cable Internet access is perfectly
analogous to that of cable television; namely, as soon as one subscribes, the cable
operator becomes an effective gatekeeper between the subscriber and all of the content or
61
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programming available through that medium.
Second, to compare the type of Internet access available by dial-up telephone modems to
the type available by cable modems is to compare apples and oranges. Not only is the
cable modem access markedly faster, but it also allows one access to video and audio
content, as well as file sharing applications, that are impossible or fatally time-consuming
to use with a dial-up modem. To say that cable does not dominate the Internet access
market because most people still use dial-up ISPs is analogous to saying that Ford did not
dominate the passenger vehicle market at the beginning of the 20th century because most
people still used horse-and-buggies. Speaking blithely of an undifferentiated “Internet
access market” elides the issue. The clear technological superiority of broadband over
narrowband dial-up Internet service renders the switch to broadband technology
inevitable. More to the point, cable operators do have a dominant market share-and in
many areas an outright monopoly-in the residential broadband Internet service market,
which is the real market at issue in the open access debate. According to the latest FCC
report-the same report quoted by Judge Middlebrooks-cable operators are estimated to
have 84% of the residential broadband Internet access market, compared to only 11% for
its closest competitor, DSL.66 Therefore, even if the judge was correct in thinking that the
Turner decision relied on the dominant market position of cable versus its competitors,
cable Internet access would still present the same problem as cable television.67
5. Distinguishing Turner: Strike Three
Finally, the judge found Turner I inapposite because “[t]he Broward County ordinance,
unlike the must-carry regulations of the FCC, threaten [sic] to diminish the free flow of
information and ideas.”68
The argument runs as follows:
[T]he [Turner] Court found that the must-carry regulations did not force the cable
operators to alter their own message or create a risk that a cable viewer might
assume that ideas or messages of the broadcaster were endorsed by the cable
operator. The Court pointed out that cable had a long history of serving as a conduit
for broadcast signals and that broadcasters were required by FCC regulation to
identify themselves at least once every hour .... In contrast, there is no history of
cable operators serving as a conduit for Internet service providers.69
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Thus, the judge appears to reason that, in a world of open access, subscribers may
wrongly associate the ideas and messages of unaffiliated ISPs with those of the cable
operator itself. The judge noted in this regard that “white supremacist groups and other
purveyors of hate” have set up elaborate sites on the Internet.70 To dispel the impression
that it endorses such messages, the cable operator would have to choose between not
offering any Internet service at all-thus impeding the free flow of information and ideas or altering its own message by serving as a conduit for content with which it does not
want to be associated.
This argument fails on its own accord. It is simply not viable to maintain that cable
Internet customers would associate offensive Internet content with the cable company. It
is not at all clear that consumers associate Internet content with their ISP, much less with
the infrastructure over which the Internet service runs. Nobody has ever suggested that
dial-up Internet customers associate offensive Internet content with the phone company.
The danger that a customer will, for instance, assume that the cable operator endorses a
neo-Nazi site that she reaches through the cable Internet service is specious, especially if
it is common knowledge that the cable company operates under an open access regime.
Additionally, a consumer would be much more likely to associate offensive television
programming with the cable operator than Internet content because, apart from must
carry and certain other obligations, consumers know that cable operators do maintain the
right to actively select the television channels they carry. Cable ISPs, on the other hand,
serve in large part as mere conduits for content produced by other, and often rival,
content producers.71 Judge Middlebrooks may be right about the lack of “history of cable
operators serving as a conduit for Internet service,” but this observation does not suggest
in any way that open access would actually “diminish the free flow of information and
ideas,”72 as he concludes. To the extent that it does point to a relevant distinction between
must carry and open access, it cuts the other way: customers are much more likely to
associate unaffiliated television programming with the cable operator than they are
unaffiliated Internet content.
In sum, the reasons given by Judge Middlebrooks to differentiate open access from must
carry, and to apply strict rather than intermediate scrutiny, do not hold up under analysis.
Like must carry before it, open access is a content-neutral regulation aimed at remedying
70
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potentially problematic conditions in an important communications and media market.
Consequently, it should face intermediate scrutiny.
B. Passing Intermediate Scrutiny
Intermediate scrutiny, as laid down in United States v. O’Brien,73 requires that the
government regulation at issue (1) promote an important governmental interest unrelated
to the suppression of speech and (2) not burden speech any more than is essential.74
Interestingly, though Judge Middlebrooks argued for strict scrutiny, he ran the
intermediate scrutiny test as well. He found that open access would fail even this less
exacting form of scrutiny. Again, however, the opinion evidences a misunderstanding of
the purposes behind open access and of the nature of the broadband market.
1. Does the regulation promote an important governmental objective?
Judge Middlebrooks argued that unbundling failed intermediate scrutiny because the
purported harm that the regulation addresses-the cable company bottleneck on Internet
service-simply does not exist. Thus, there could be no excuse for any infringement of the
cable company’s speech. “[T]he harm the ordinance is purported to address appears to be
non-existent. Cable possesses no monopoly power with respect to Internet access.”75 But
I have already shown that the opinion confuses the danger of cable bottleneck control
over broadband with the danger of cable monopoly. It is principally the former that open
access seeks to mitigate. Moreover, the Broward County opinion ignores the fact that
cable possesses 84% of the national market share in residential broadband service,76 even
though the judge cites numbers to that effect in the text of his opinion.77 Consequently,
Judge Middlebrooks is mistaken when he writes that the “harm the ordinance is purported
to address appears to be non-existent.78”
Like most legislation, open access is prospective. Much of the impetus behind open
access provisions stems from fears about how the broadband Internet market will develop
over the next few years. The judge is right to probe whether or not these fears are
justified. He correctly states, “When the government defends a regulation on speech it
must demonstrate that the harm it seeks to prevent is real, not merely conjectural, and that
the regulation will alleviate the harm in a direct and material way.”79 However, one may
already point to a number of worrying activities of cable operators that indicate the kind
73
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of harmful medium-shaping power they have in the absence of unbundling regulations.
For instance, cable company ISPs offer their preferred content and e-commerce partners
local caching of websites, resulting in much quicker download times than for non-cached
material.80 This is a blatantly anti-competitive policy that disadvantages all Internet actors
who do not already have partnership deals with one of the two cable-modem ISPs. It is
easy to understand why smaller e-commerce sites and independent content producers are
particularly worried about a cable bottleneck on a large percentage of household Internet
access. They would almost certainly suffer competitively if their online offerings were
consistently presented more slowly and shabbily than the content of e-commerce
providers affiliated with the cable operators.
In addition, current cable-based ISPs do not allow streaming Internet videos to exceed ten
minutes.81 Many assume that this rule is in place because cable operators do not want to
cannibalize their own cable television operations by encouraging video-over-Internet.82
Be that as it may, it means that one of the primary advantages of broadband Internet
access-the ability to receive full-length high-quality streaming video files- is eliminated
as a consequence of the market power of the cable operators. These policies illustrate the
power of exclusive cable ISPs to pick winners and losers in online applications.83 Who,
after all, would spend their time developing broadband Internet technologies if they were
not sure such applications would be allowed to run on the cable platform?
We have yet to witness the whole parade of horribles that might result from cable’s
bottleneck control over a vast majority of household Internet connections. Cable ISPs are
not clumsily filtering out large swaths of the Internet, or denying customers access to
popular applications like e-mail or online chatting. But the examples cited above, coupled
with the dominant position that cable continues to enjoy in residential broadband access,
provide striking evidence that the harm open access “seeks to prevent is real, not merely
conjectural.”84
Again, the must carry case provides an apt analogy. One of Congress’ main rationales for
requiring cable operators to carry broadcast television stations was the fear that free
broadcast television would die if cable operators were allowed to drop those channels
80
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from their repertoire.85 While the minority in the Turner cases believed that Congress’
fear was misplaced and that must carry failed to alleviate an actual harm,86 the majority
explained the proper judicial role as follows:
The question is not whether Congress, as an objective matter, was correct to
determine must-carry is necessary to prevent a substantial number of broadcast
stations from losing cable carriage and suffering significant financial hardship.
Rather, the question is whether the legislative conclusion was reasonable and
supported by substantial evidence in the record before Congress. In making that
determination, we are not to ‘re-weigh the evidence de novo, or to replace
Congress’ factual predictions with our own.’ Rather, we are simply to determine if
the standard is satisfied.87
Judge Middlebrooks demanded an objectively correct prediction from the County vis-àvis the future development of broadband Internet access-a standard of scrutiny no
legislation could possibly pass. He proceeded to re-weigh the evidence de novo and
replace Broward County’s predictions with the FCC’s.88 The Turner Broadcasting
System Inc. v. FCC (Turner II) Court declared, “We need not put our imprimatur on
Congress’ economic theory in order to validate the reasonableness of its judgment.”89
Thus, even if Judge Middlebrooks would find on the available evidence that unbundling
was not needed to mitigate the danger of a closed broadband platform, his judicial task is
simply to determine whether the legislative body made a reasonable judgment to the
contrary. Had he correctly understood the bottleneck problem, acknowledged the
dominant position of cable in the broadband market, and noted the cable operators’
demonstrated proclivity to exploit their bottleneck control, he would have been
compelled to find that the Broward County Commission made a reasonable decision that
a closed cable system constitutes a real harm to its citizens.
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As the Broward County opinion acknowledged, the County’s open access regulation was
“designed to ensure ‘competition’ and ‘diversity’ in cable broadband Internet services.”90
There is little doubt that this goal, ensuring competition and diversity in the Internet
content and online application markets, constitutes an “important ... governmental
interest.”91 As the content and applications of the broadband Internet become more and
more central to the everyday lives of Americans, the governmental interest in a
competitive online environment, “promoting the widespread dissemination of
information from a multiplicity of sources,”92 will only grow. The Court has recognized
the Internet as an important national and international medium of communication.93
Ensuring that the markets for Internet service, content, and applications remain robust
and competitive is undoubtedly a government interest of great import.94
2. Does the regulation burden any more speech than is essential?
Because Judge Middlebrooks concluded that “[i]t has not been demonstrated that the
Broward County ordinance furthers a substantial governmental interest,”95 he found that
open access failed the first prong of the intermediate scrutiny test. Thus, he did not
address its second prong. Had he done so, as I argue he should have, he would have asked
whether the regulation burdens any more speech than is essential to secure the interest at
stake. Here, the County’s case is straight-forward. Cable operators’ bottleneck control
over the dominant broadband facility, namely cable lines, endangers competition,
diversity, and open network architecture on the broadband Internet. Open access
eliminates the cable operator’s bottleneck control over cable Internet by requiring cable
operators to lease bandwidth to unaffiliated ISPs at non-discriminatory rates. Unbundling
does not force cable operators to carry any particular ISP or any particular content; it
simply requires them, in the words of the Broward County ordinance, to “provide any
requesting Internet Service Provider access to its Broadband Internet Access Transport
Services ... on rates, terms, and conditions that are at least as favorable as those on which
90
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it provides such access to itself, to its affiliate, or to any other person.”96 As the City of
Portland asks in one of its trial briefs, “how else” could the City “have addressed the
bottleneck problem effectively without eliminating the bottleneck?”97
The burden on the cable operator’s speech is as minimal as it could be to achieve this end.
That “burden” consists of the possibility that some Internet content which the cable
company’s preferred ISP would have blocked may run over the cable company’s lines.
As noted before, because consumers are not at all likely to associate Internet content with
a cable company operating under open access, the alleged harm to the speech interest of
the cable operator is de minimis. Certainly, it is equal to or less than the harm done in
requiring cable operators to carry, without charge, local broadcast stations.
To be clear, open access does reduce the editorial discretion of cable operators, and it
may lead to some offensive speech being transmitted on their lines that they would
otherwise prefer not to transmit. But this discrete harm to the cable operator’s speech
rights is outweighed even if we restrict our analysis to First Amendment concerns. There
are, as Judge Breyer noted in his Turner II concurrence, “important First Amendment
interests on both sides of the equation.”98 On the one hand is the autonomy of the cable
operator to determine the content it carries; on the other, there is the public interest in an
“uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”99 free speech market. The Court has already noted
how these two interests conflict on the cable medium: “A cable operator, unlike speakers
in other media, can ... silence the voice of competing speakers with a mere flick of the
switch. The potential for abuse of this private power over a central avenue of
communication cannot be overlooked.”100 The Court concluded that “[t]he First
Amendment’s command that government not impede the freedom of speech does not
disable the government from taking steps to ensure that private interests not restrict,
through physical control of a critical pathway of communication, the free flow of
information and ideas.”101 Open access, like must carry before it, aims to ensure that
cable operators are not allowed to exert their vast power to “silence the voice of
competing speakers with a mere flick of the switch.”102 Unbundling serves to promote the
free flow of information and ideas, not to threaten it as Judge Middlebrooks contends.
Finally, it may be suggested that there are other means to promote diversity and
competition in broadband Internet services and content that would not lead to any burden
on the cable operators’ editorial discretion. But the Supreme Court has already noted that
96
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“our cases establish that content-neutral regulations are not ‘invalid simply because there
is some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on speech.”‘103
Consequently, a court reviewing open access is not obligated to determine whether the
regulation is the “least restrictive means” possible to achieving the governmental
objective.104 Even so, open access opponents have not yet suggested any less restrictive
regulations that would ensure open ISP competition on the dominant broadband platform.
Of course, one can think up such alternatives. Instead of requiring open access on the
cable lines, perhaps the government could subsidize DSL subscription massively to
ensure that at least one open-access broadband platform succeeds in the market.
Alternatively, the government could simply buy a sufficient share in the cable companies
to impose open access through shareholder control. But one suspects that the cable
operators would be opposed to these highly interventionist alternatives.
In sum, the burden imposed by open access is “congruent to the benefits it affords.”105 It
aims to mitigate the dangers of a cable bottleneck on the most popular broadband Internet
facility, although achieving this goal inevitably diminishes-very marginally-the editorial
discretion of the cable operators. Thus open access presents a perfect example of the kind
of content-neutral, speech-enhancing regulation that intermediate scrutiny permits the
government to enact.
IV. CONCLUSION
Any court that subjects open access to the intermediate scrutiny test, as I argue it must,
will find that it passes with flying colors. However, the purpose of this study is not to
argue that local franchising authorities, the FCC, or Congress should adopt open access
regulations. To the contrary, the thrust of my argument has been that unbundling sustains
a direct First Amendment challenge whether or not one agrees with it as a worthwhile
policy initiative. Of course, regulatory bodies that pass open access ordinances must
show substantial evidence that there is some real danger in a closed broadband
infrastructure. To this end, open access proponents can bear this burden simply by
pointing to the anti-competitive activities of the current cable ISPs.106
The resolution of the open access debate could very well determine the basic architecture
of the dominant communications medium of the twenty-first century. Judge
Middlebrooks’ opinion in Broward County would, if endorsed by the Supreme Court,
effectively short-circuit the debate on constitutional grounds. If open access truly violated
the First Amendment, judicial determination of the issue would be entirely appropriate.
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Turner II, 520 U.S. at 217 (citation omitted).
See id. (“‘So long as the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the
government’s interest, ... the regulation will not be invalid simply because a court concludes that the
government’s interest could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative.”‘) (citation
omitted).
105
Id. at 215 (discussing the burdens and benefits of must carry).
106
See supra text accompanying notes 80-83.
104
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However, Judge Middlebrooks’ opinion is severely flawed, and a more careful analysis of
First Amendment precedent shows that open access is entirely consistent with the Free
Speech Clause.107 Consequently, the First Amendment should not serve as a bar to open
access regulation, and the debate over its policy merits should continue.

107

Broward County has appealed Judge Middlebrooks’ ruling to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and
the parties will begin filing with the appellate court in March 2001. Interview with Anitra Lanczi, Assistant
County Attorney, Broward County Attorney’s Office (Feb. 16, 2001).
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